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Addressing the Patent Gold Rush:
The Role of Deference to PTO Patent Denials
Arti Rai*
Patents have rarely captured the legal imagination. Patent law has
been seen as an abstruse area, best left to a few specialists trained in
the technical arcana of claim drafting and interpretation. With the
advent of the information economy, however, one conventional
wisdom with respect to patents is being overturned. Even for those
who would rather do so, it is difficult to ignore the headlong rush to
claim patent rights in the two dynamic, rapidly evolving industries
that undergird the information economy— biotechnology and
computer technology.1 After all, inventions long thought
“unpatentable”— everything from gene sequences of unknown
* Associate Professor of Law, University of San Diego. I thank Ronal Levin, Aai
Prakash, Michael Rappaport and the participants at the January 2000 USD Colloquium for
helpful comments.
1. See, e.g., Eliot Marshall, Patent Office Faces 90-Year Backlog, 272 SCI. 643 (1996)
(discussing patent applications that have been filed on hundreds of thousands of DNA
sequences); Rodney Ho, Patents Hit Record in ‘98 as Tech Firms Rushed to Protect Intellectual
Property, WALL ST. J., Jan. 15, 1999, at A2 (noting that 151,024 patents were issued in 1998, a
“staggering” 33% jump from 133,720 in 1997 and that much of the increase was due to growing
acceptance of computer-related patents); Lori Valigra, Genomics at Heart of Revolution in
Corporations, Global Economy, BIOTECHNOLOGY NEWSWATCH, Aug. 17, 1998 (reporting that
the United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) received 4000 requests for patents on
nucleic acid sequences in 1991 and 500,000 in 1996); Raymond Van Dyke, Software Patents
Offer Opportunities and Obstacles, NAT’L L.J., May 24, 1999, at C19, C20 (observing that data
processing and computer group of the PTO issued up to 40% more patents in 1998 than in 1997
and that Internet patents “exploded from a mere nine in 1991 to about 1600 in 1998”). Within
the computer program category, one particularly controversial area where patent filings are
mushrooming is business concepts and methods. See Robert P. Merges, As Many As Six
Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights For Business Concepts and Patent
System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577 (1999) (discussing growth in business method
patents); Gregory J. Maeir et al., Patent Protection Provides Long-Term Net Strategy, NAT’L
L.J., Oct. 18, 1999, at B11 (noting comment by PTO Commissioner Todd Dickinson that the
PTO has, since 1998, experienced a 700% increase in the number of filings on software and
business-method patents).
My claim that biotechnology is a central part of the information economy may, at first
blush, appear anomalous. However, because biotechnology is founded on DNA and DNA is
ultimately just information, biotechnology is clearly an information industry.
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function to one-step purchasing over the Internet— are now being
claimed as property. For many, the race to patent such products and
processes raises the specter of tightly restricted information flow and
retarded innovation and development, in these economically vital
industries.2
The proliferation of high-technology patents directly implicates
the two institutions that are primarily responsible for administering
the patent system— the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(PTO), which grants patents, and the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit (CAFC), which hears all patent appeals.3 Thus far, however,
commentators have tended to focus not on the institutional actors but
rather on change in the substantive patent law.4 Moreover, even those
who have begun to address the role of institutions have concentrated
on the PTO, largely to the exclusion of the CAFC and the
relationship between the CAFC and the PTO.5 In failing to address
2. See infra notes 19-20, 47-49 and accompanying text. For a creative and wide-ranging
critique of the growing “propertization” of information, see generally JAMES BOYLE,
SHAMANS, SPLEENS, AND SOFTWARE (1996).
3. The CAFC hears two different types of patent appeals: direct appeals from PTO patent
denials and appeals from district court decisions regarding patent infringement. This Article
focuses on appeals from PTO patent denials.
4. In the computer program context there has been a plethora of articles addressing how
the terms of the patent statute should be applied and/or altered. See, e.g., Vincent Chiappetta,
Patentability of Computer Software Instruction as an “Article of Manufacture:” Software As
Such as the Right Stuff, 17 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 89, 95 (1998) (arguing that
the test for whether a software invention constitutes patentable subject matter should turn on
whether the software is being used for technological purposes); Julie Cohen, Reverse
Engineering and the Rise of Electronic Vigilantism: Intellectual Property Implications of
“Lock-Out” Programs, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1092, 1168 (1995) (arguing for an interpretation of
the nonobviousness standard that excludes from consideration the mathematical algorithm
component of the computer software); Pamela Samuelson et al., A Manifesto Concerning the
Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308 (1994) (calling for sui
generis protection of computer programs); Pamela Samuelson, Benson Revisited: The Case
Against Patent Protection for Algorithms and Other Computer Program-Related Inventions, 39
EMORY L.J. 1025 (1990). The biotechnology literature has not been as voluminous.
Nonetheless, several commentators have criticized the interpretations of the patent statute
rendered by the CAFC. Compare Janice M. Mueller, The Evolving Application of the Written
Description Requirement to Biotechnological Inventions, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 615 (1998)
(arguing that the CAFC’s interpretation of patentability requirements has been too strict), with
Philipe Ducor, Recombinant Products and Nonobviousness: A Typology, 13 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 31-49 (1997) (arguing that CAFC’s approach to patentability
has been too lax).
5. See, e.g., Merges, supra note 1, at 611-15; Mark D. Janis, Rethinking Reexamination:
Toward a Viable Administrative Revocation System for U.S. Patent Law, 11 HARV. J.L. &
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the relationship between the CAFC and the PTO, particularly in the
context of CAFC review of PTO patent denials, commentators ignore
several important historical and institutional realities. First, the
CAFC’s reversal of PTO decisions denying patent protection to
certain biotechnology and computer program inventions has been a
major reason for the recent proliferation of patents. Second, given the
CAFC’s frequent exercise of its ability to reverse PTO patent denials,
PTO reform will, on its own, likely be insufficient. Third, at least for
the time being, the most prudent course for addressing patent
proliferation may not be a significant change in substantive patent
law.
The absence of attention to the proper role of the CAFC in
reviewing PTO decisions denying patentability reflects a larger
tendency among patent law scholars to ignore the application of
administrative law principles to patent law. Similarly, the CAFC
itself has refused to apply administrative law principles to its review
of PTO decisions denying patentability. The recent explosion of
patent filings in biotechnology and computer software highlights the
importance of determining how administrative law principles such as
deference should apply to the relationship between the CAFC and the
PTO. Deference implicates considerations of institutional
competence, and such considerations should figure prominently in
any inquiry regarding how the law should engage technologically
complex, rapidly expanding industries.
This Article analyzes the CAFC and PTO as an integrated
institution.6 From that perspective, although the Article strongly
TECH. 1 (1997); Allan M. Soobert, Breaking New Grounds in Administrative Revocation of U.S.
Patents: A Proposition for Opposition— and Beyond, 14 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH
TECH. L.J. 63 (1998). One notable exception is Craig Allen Nard, Deference, Defiance, and the
Useful Arts, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 1415 (1995). Professor Nard makes a general argument in favor
of deference to the PTO’s factual and legal determinations. His argument, however, does not
focus on the role of the CAFC in reversing PTO patent denials or on the particular issues raised
by patenting in rapidly evolving industries such as biotechnology or computer software.
6. A caveat on the scope of the Article should be noted at the outset. Although I propose
modest institutional changes in the context of the CAFC’s direct review of PTO patent denials.
I take as given the basic institutional structure of the patent system. In other words, I do not, for
the purposes of this Article, challenge the need for an expert administrative agency that grants
patents and a specialized court that constructs a uniform body of appellate law regarding
patents. For an early assessment of the Federal Circuit as an experiment in specialized courts,
see Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64
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endorses recent proposals for significant PTO reform, it also argues
that PTO reform will not be sufficient. In addition to PTO reform, a
reexamination of the relationship between the CAFC and the PTO is
needed. With respect to this relationship, considerations of
institutional competence— particularly institutional resources and
expertise— suggest that the CAFC should be wary of reviewing
independently PTO’s decisions denying patentability. The CAFC’s
review should be particularly deferential when the denial is based on
a determination that the invention is “obvious”— that is, not truly
new. Deference to patent denials is warranted moreover, even if the
PTO continues to have skewed incentives as well as limitations on its
own resources and expertise: these limitations will tend
systematically to produce errors in patent grants, not patent denials.
Indeed, as a consequence, PTO reform will be much more important
for ensuring valid PTO patent grants than for ensuring valid PTO
patent denials.
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I identifies the factors
that have led to the current state of patent filings, arguing that the
evidence points squarely towards certain questionable CAFC
decisions that reversed prior denials of patentability by the PTO. Part
II discusses why the most effective approach to the patent problem
will involve a combination of PTO reform and greater deference to
PTO decisions denying patentability. This Part stresses the
importance of deference with respect to the patentability requirement
of nonobviousness, which is likely to play the central gatekeeping
role in limiting excess patenting in both biotechnology and computer
software. Part III then addresses the administrative law doctrines
through which greater deference to the PTO patentability denials
could, and should, be implemented.
I. EXPLAINING THE PATENT GOLD RUSH: THE CAFC’S ROLE
I begin by discussing how the CAFC’s reversal of PTO decisions
constraining patentability in the areas of biotechnology and computer
technology has led to the current plethora of patents and patent
filings. In biotechnology the patent proliferation is a result of the
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1989).
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CAFC’s disagreement with the PTO over DNA-based inventions.
Specifically, the CAFC’s treatment of DNA-based inventions as just
another species of chemical compound has substantially diminished
the balance between property rights and the public domain achieved
by various patentability requirements— most importantly the
requirement of nonobviousness.
Nonobviousness balances patent rights and the public domain by
excluding from patentability subject matter that “would have been
obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having
ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.”7
Showing that an invention is “obvious to try” does not defeat
patentability.8 Rather, there must be a “reasonable likelihood of
success” that a workable invention will emerge.9 In the context of an
ordinary chemical compound, the nonobviousness requirement is
7. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1994). Nonobviousness is the most litigated issue related to patent
validity. DONALD CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 11-06 (1999). It has been called the
“ultimate condition of patentability.” NONOBVIOUSNESS— THE ULTIMATE CONDITION OF
PATENTABILITY (John F. Witherspoon ed., 1980). A recent study by Paul Allison and Mark
Lemley indicates that 42% of patents that are held invalid in litigation are invalidated on
grounds of nonobviousness. John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the
Validity of Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 204 (1998). To a lesser but nonetheless
important extent, the novelty requirement protects the public domain by excluding from
patentability an invention that is already “known or used” or “described in a printed
publication” at the time that the patent application is filed. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994). The
Allison and Lemley study indicates that 26.8% of patents that are held invalid in litigation are
invalidated on novelty grounds. Id. In addition to novelty and nonobviousness, the requirements
of patentable subject matter, utility, and enablement also play some role in balancing property
rights and the public domain. Id. §§ 101, 112. The patentable subject matter requirement
excludes from patentability abstract scientific and mathematical principles, thus allowing these
“basic tools” of science and technology to be available for all scientists to draw upon. See
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71-72 (1972). But see infra 31-42 and accompanying text
(discussing CAFC’s virtual elimination of this requirement in the area of computer programs).
The utility requirement also serves to exclude abstract principles from patentability. See
Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519 (1966). Finally, the enablement requirement limits the
patentee to the range of invention that she has disclosed “in such full, clear, concise, and exact
terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains . . . to make and use the same
. . . .” 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994).
8. In re O’Farrell, 853 F.2d 894, 903 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
9. See, e.g., In re Dow Chem. Co., 837 F.2d 469, 473 (Fed. Cir. 1988). Allowing
patentability when there is no “reasonable likelihood of success” that a workable invention will
emerge can be particularly important in biotechnology, where the results of experimentation are
often unpredictable or uncertain. For a discussion of the relationship between uncertainty and
the nonobviousness standard, see Robert Merges, Uncertainty and the Standard of
Patentability, 7 HIGH TECH. L.J. 1 (1992).
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satisfied so long as there is no structurally similar compound in the
prior art.10 In ordinary chemistry there are good scientific reasons for
having a nonobviousness standard focused on structure: the
properties of chemical compounds are notoriously difficult to predict,
and one of the few rules of prediction available to the chemist is that
structurally similar compounds have similar properties. Thus, as a
general matter, a chemist is likely to be able to synthesize a chemical
compound with a particular set of useful properties only if she is
already aware of a structurally similar compound that has similar
properties.11 Conversely, a chemist who synthesizes a compound with
a particular set of useful properties even though there is no prior
available information regarding structurally similar compounds with
similar properties is likely to have invented a nonobvious product.
This chemical compound-based logic does not apply, however, to
DNA sequences. Although DNA sequences represent chemical
compounds, they are more fundamentally carriers of information. For
example, in order to isolate a particular DNA sequence that codes for
a particular protein, there is no need to start with a structurally similar
DNA sequence. Rather, as the PTO has pointed out, because of the
informational link between proteins, amino acids, and DNA,
knowledge of the protein’s complete or partial amino acid sequence
can be used to obtain the desired DNA sequence.12 To put the point
another way, the current state of scientific knowledge renders the
DNA sequence for a given protein obvious once the protein’s
10. See, e.g., In re Dillon, 919 F.2d 688, 692 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
11. Id. at 693. See also Robert Blackburn, Evolving Patent Law in the New Age of
Biomedical Science, 4 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 87, 88 (1999) (noting that in traditional
pharmaceutical chemistry, the chemist makes many derivatives of a given “lead compound”
that has a desirable activity in the hope of finding a derivative that has similar activity but can
be manufactured more efficiently).
12. The informational link between proteins, amino acids, and DNA operates as follows.
Proteins comprise amino acids that are bonded together covalently. There are a total of twenty
possible amino acids that can form proteins. The particular amino acids that form any given
protein along with the sequence in which the amino acids are bonded together determine the
function of the proteins. Therefore, in order to assemble a protein, an organism needs
information about which amino acids should be used and the order in which the amino acids
should be assembled. A gene stores this information in subunits called nucleotide bases. The
four nucleotide bases are adenine, guanine, cytosine, and thymine (usually abbreviated as
A,G,C, and T respectively). A gene is a sequence of these bases and each three-base component
of the gene sequence codes for an amino acid. See generally KENNETH J. BURCHFIEL,
BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 17-20 (1995).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol2/iss1/7
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complete or partial amino acid sequence is known.13
Nonetheless, despite the PTO’s arguments to the contrary, the
CAFC has applied chemical compound-based logic wholesale to
DNA inventions.14 In overturning PTO determinations regarding
nonobviousness, the CAFC has said that DNA sequences are obvious
only if there is a structurally similar DNA sequence in the prior art.15
Under the CAFC’s contorted logic, a DNA sequence can be
nonobvious even though the information necessary for isolating the
sequence is publicly available.16 This very significant lowering of the
standard for nonobviousness has resulted in a situation where many
biotechnology companies are seeking patents on hundreds of
thousands of DNA sequences of unknown or speculative function
that they have been able to isolate quickly through routine, automated
13. See Ex parte Deuel, 33 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1445, 1447 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int’f 1993) (noting
views of PTO patent examiners that “when the [amino acid] sequence of a protein is placed into
the public domain, the gene is also placed into the public domain because of the routine nature
of cloning techniques”).
14. Perhaps not surprisingly, the author of the relevant opinions, Judge Lourie, holds a
Ph.D. in chemistry (as contrasted with molecular biology or biochemistry). See ALMANAC OF
THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (Christine Houser ed., 1999). For a discussion of why the CAFC is
not particularly well equipped to handle specific technical questions despite its concentration in
the area of patents and the fact that some of its judges have technical backgrounds, see infra
note 64 and accompanying text.
The CAFC’s decisions expanding the scope of patentability in biotechnology and computer
software may be the result not only of institutional competence limitations but also of a
systematic bias in favor of patent applicants. See, e.g., Donald R. Dunner et al., A Statistical
Look at the Federal Circuit’s Patent Decisions: 1982-1994, 5 FED. CIR. B.J. 151, 154 (1995)
(noting that the CAFC is “much more likely to affirm district court judgments in favor of patent
owners than accused infringers”). Various commentators have discussed the danger of bias
faced by specialized courts. See, e.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 6, at 3; RICHARD POSNER, THE
FEDERAL COURTS 157 (1985). See also Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts:
1967-1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1039, 1069 (1997) (noting that “modern public choice
theory regards not just administrative agencies but also legislatures, the President, and to an
increasing degree even the courts, as institutions that should be modeled on the assumption that
they seek to maximized their self-interested ends . . .”) (emphasis added).
15. See In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1557-58, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“Because Deuel
claims new chemical entities in structural terms . . . a prima facie case of obviousness is based
upon structural similarity, i.e. an established structural relationship between a prior art
compound and the claimed compound. . . . The PTO’s focus on known methods for potentially
isolating the claimed DNA molecules is . . . misplaced because the claims at issue define
compounds, not methods.”) (citations omitted).
16. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg & Robert P. Merges, Opinion Letter as to the Patentability
of Certain Inventions Associated with the Identification of Partial cDNA Sequences, 23 AIPLA
Q.J. 1, 32 (1996) (noting that the CAFC’s approach “would seem to make all novel DNA
sequences patentable, however trivial the scientific advance that led to their identification”).
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methods.17 The CAFC’s interpretation of nonobviousness has thus
skewed the balance between property rights and the public domain
quite significantly against the public domain.18 Moreover, there is
reason to believe that forcing future researchers to navigate a thicket
of property rights obstacles, particularly in the context of relatively
basic scientific information, will impede scientific research and
development.19 Notably, in overturning the PTO’s denials of
patentability, the CAFC has shown no deference; indeed, it has not
even suggested that principles of deference might apply.20
17. See, e.g., Marshall, supra note 1 (noting that the biotechnology company Incyte
claims to have filed applications on over 400,000 DNA sequence fragments). Proposed
guidelines on utility recently issued by the PTO indicate that gene fragments of unknown
function will be denied patentability for failure to show utility. See REVISED INTERIM UTILITY
GUIDELINES TRAINING MATERIALS 50-53. The problematic position on nonobviousness
enunciated by the CAFC is still the law, however, and would apply to any DNA sequences that
met the utility standard.
18. In contrast with its use of the nonobviousness requirement, the CAFC has used the
written description requirement (which requires that the patentee convey with “sufficient detail
that one skilled in the art can clearly conclude that the ‘inventor’ invented the claimed
invention”) in a manner that somewhat raises patentability standards. Regents of the University
of California v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1997). The Lilly case is
consistent with Deuel in that both cases view DNA-based technology as a subset of chemical
technology. For further discussion of the Regents case, see Arti K. Rai, Intellectual Property
Rights in Biotechnology: Addressing New Technology, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 827, 834-35
(1999). It is important to note, however, that this raising of the patentability standard in the
context of the written description requirement does not by any means counterbalance the effect
on the public domain of the CAFC’s having virtually eliminated the nonobviousness standard
with respect to DNA. While the elimination of the nonobviousness standard allows for a vast
proliferation of patents on relatively trivial inventions, the fortification of the written
description requirement serves merely to narrow the scope of the claims that can be made for
some of these inventions. Even with narrow claims the patent owner can still exert an
inefficient level of control over future research. For further discussion of this issue, see Arti K.
Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science, 94
NW. U. L. REV. 77, 141 (1999).
19. For arguments that the proliferation of property rights in basic biomedical research
will impede scientific progress, see Rai, supra note 18, at 120-35; Michael A. Heller & Rebecca
S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280
SCI. 698 (1998).
20. See In re Deuel, supra; In re Bell, 991 F.2d 781 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (failing to mention
deference in overturning PTO determination that DNA sequence in question was obvious).
Moreover, in other nonobviousness cases the CAFC has specifically rejected deference to the
PTO’s final decisionmaking body, the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences. According to
the Federal Circuit, because nonobviousness is a question of law, there should be no deference.
See, e.g., In re Donaldson, 16 F.3d 1189, 1192 (1994) (“Obviousness under section 103 is a
question of law that this court reviews de novo.”); In re McCarthy, 763 F.2d 411, 412 (Fed. Cir.
1985) (“Obviousness is a conclusion of law. It is our responsibility, as for all appellate courts,
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol2/iss1/7
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The profusion of patent filings in the area of computer programs
can also be traced (albeit somewhat less directly) to the CAFC’s
disagreements with the PTO. In order to understand these
disagreements, one must examine the historical development of the
area. Prior to the formation of the CAFC in 1982,21 the patent law’s
focus on applied technology— a focus embodied in the Constitutional
requirement that patents are to be granted only on the “useful Arts”
and in the Congressional definition of patentable subject matter as a
“useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter”22—
was applied by the courts to exclude most mathematical algorithms,
and hence most computer programs,23 from the domain of patentable
subject matter. Algorithms/computer programs were seen as similar
to abstract scientific principles or ideas— in other words as “basic
tools” of science and technology that all researchers should be free to
use. For example, in the 1972 case Gottschalk v. Benson,24 the
Supreme Court rejected a patent on a computerized method for
converting decimal numbers to binary numbers on the grounds that
patent principles did not apply to abstract scientific or mathematical
principles, including mathematical principles embodied in computer
software.25 In the 1981 decision Diamond v. Diehr, the Court
narrowed Gottschalk by upholding as patentable subject matter a
rubber-curing process that centered around using software
(specifically, software that implemented the Arrhenius equation) to
to apply the law correctly, without deference to Board determinations, which may be in error
even if there is a rational basis therefor.”). In addition, the CAFC has argued that the Supreme
Court’s main analytical framework for deference to administrative agencies, found in Chevron
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 487 U.S. 835 (1984), should not apply to PTO
decisionmaking, whether issued through rulemaking or adjudication. See Merck & Co. v.
Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1549-50 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (Chevron deference inapplicable to PTO
rulemaking); In re Portola Packaging, Inc., 110 F.3d 786, 788 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (Chevron
deference inapplicable to PTO adjudication).
21. The legislation that created the CAFC, the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982,
28 U.S.C. §§ 41-144 (1994), was driven by Congress’ desire to unify and strengthen the patent
law in the face of the forum shopping and the uncertainty that resulted from the widely
divergent patent decisions of the various regional federal courts of appeal. See generally
Dreyfuss, supra note 6, at 6-7.
22. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (emphasis added).
23. Computer programs comprise the subset of mathematical algorithms that are
implemented via a computer.
24. 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
25. Id. at 69-70.
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calculate the appropriate cure time. The Court, however, was still
concerned with excluding from patentability computer software that
was abstract.26 The Diehr Court equated physicality with lack of
abstraction and thus limited patentability of processes containing
software to those situations where the software was clearly involved
in physically “transforming . . . an article into a different state or
thing.”27
In response to the Supreme Court’s emphasis on physicality in
Diehr, the predecessor to the CAFC, the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals, formulated the so-called Freeman-Walter-Abele (“FWA”)
test for assessing the patentability of mathematical algorithms,
including algorithms implemented via computer software. Under the
test, “it is first determined if a mathematical algorithm is recited
directly or indirectly in the claim. If so, it is next determined if the
claimed invention as a whole is no more than the algorithm itself—
that is, whether or not the claim is directed to a mathematical
algorithm that is not applied to or limited by physical elements or
process steps. Such claims are nonstatutory [i.e., not patentable
subject matter].”28 Under the FWA test physical elements are the
relevant limitations with respect to a product claim (i.e., a claim to a
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter); process steps that
produce a change in a tangible medium are the relevant limitations
with respect to a process/method claim.29
The physicality standard is hardly a perfect proxy for lack of
abstraction. As discussed further below,30 algorithms that are used for
non-physical activities such as information processing may be quite
concrete. Indeed, as the CAFC’s decisions have made clear, precisely
what constitutes a “physical” product or process is a tricky question.
26. Like Gottschalk, Diehr stated explicitly that “abstract ideas” were not patentable
subject matter. Id. at 185.
27. Id. at 192.
28. Arrhythmia Research Technology, Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, 1058 (Fed.
Cir. 1992).
29. See In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758, 767 (C.C.P.A. 1980) (“Once a mathematical algorithm
has been found, the claim as a whole must be further analyzed. If it appears that the
mathematical algorithm is implemented in a specific manner to define structural relationships
between the physical elements of the claim (in apparatus claims) or to refine or limit claim steps
(in process claims), the claim being otherwise statutory, the claim passes muster under § 101.”).
30. See infra text following note 31.
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Nonetheless, a reasonably strict interpretation of the FWA test would
have served to exclude a substantial number of abstract computer
programs from patentability. For example, under a strict
interpretation of the FWA test, the computerized calculation of the
Arrhenius equation at issue in Diehr would not have been patentable
if it had been claimed on its own, rather than as part of a specific
process for physically transforming rubber.
The CAFC soon began to interpret the test’s “physical elements or
process steps” restriction, however, in a manner that rendered it a
nullity. For example, in the 1989 decision In re Iwahashi,31 the
CAFC applied the FWA test to uphold as patentable subject matter an
invention that was essentially a mathematical algorithm for pattern
recognition. In reversing the PTO’s determination that the invention
was merely a mathematical algorithm, the CAFC held that the
requirement of a limiting physical element was satisfied by the very
electronic circuitry necessary to perform the mathematical steps.32
Following the logic of Iwahashi, any mathematical algorithm could
be a patentable product, so long as it was performed by a computer
(or other physical element). Consequently, the large number of
mathematical algorithms that are sufficiently complicated that they
can only be performed plausibly by a computer would inevitably be
patentable subject matter. Similarly, in Arrythmia Research
Technology, Inc. v. Corazonix Corporation,33 the CAFC determined
that a mathematical process for detecting and analyzing
electrocardiographic signals was patentable subject matter.
According to the CAFC, the requirement that there be a physical
transformation could be satisfied by the fact that the process
transformed the analog heart signal to a filtered digital signal.34
Under the reasoning of the Arrythmia case, any algorithm that takes
as its input data represented in electronic form and transforms the
data in some way is patentable subject matter.
31. 888 F.2d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
32. Id. at 1375.
33. 958 F.2d 1053 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
34. Id. at 1059 (“These claimed steps of ‘converting,’ ‘applying,’ ‘determining,’ and
‘comparing’ are physical process steps that transform one physical, electrical signal into
another.”).
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After it became clear that, under the CAFC’s interpretation, the
physical elements or process limitation of the FWA test could be
fulfilled by virtually any algorithm implemented via a computer,
patent applications on computer software became quite common.35
Ultimately, even the CAFC recognized its interpretation of the
physical element or process limitation for the fiction that it had
become. In re Alappat,36 decided in 1994, was the first step in the
interment of the FWA test. Alappat, which was yet another appeal
from a PTO rejection of patentability, involved a mathematical
algorithm that transformed vector data into continuous lines for
display. In holding that the apparatus that embodied the algorithm
was patentable subject matter, the CAFC did not even attempt to
argue that the apparatus provided the physical element limitation
required by the FWA test. Rather, the CAFC relegated the test to a
footnote and focused on the fact that the apparatus “produce[d] a
useful, concrete, and tangible result.”37 Then, in State Street & Trust
Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc.,38 the Federal Circuit
explicitly rejected the “physicality” limitations of the FWA test.39 In
holding that a computerized data processing apparatus for
implementing a particular type of investment structure was patentable
subject matter, the Federal Circuit emphasized that mathematical
algorithms are patentable so long as they produce a “useful” result,
including (in the case of the State Street patent) something as non-
physical as a final share value.40 Indeed, in emphasizing “practical
utility” as the hallmark of whether a mathematical algorithm
constitutes statutory subject matter,41 the CAFC essentially collapsed
the patentable subject matter requirement into the utility requirement,
35. See, e.g., Lawrence M. Fisher, The Executive Computer: Will Users to Be the Big
Losers in Software Patent Battles?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1994, at C3.
36. In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (1994).
37. Id. at 1544.
38. 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
39. Id. at 1374 (noting that “the Freeman-Walter-Abele test has little, if any, applicability
to determining the presence of statutory subject matter”).
40. Id. at 1373.
41. Id. at 1375 (noting that “[t]he question of whether a claim encompasses statutory
subject matter should not focus on which of the four categories of subject matter a claim is
directed to— process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter— but rather on the
essential characteristics of the subject matter, in particular, its practical utility”) (emphasis
omitted).
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even though the latter is a separate condition of patentability under
the patent statute. The State Street decision also rejected as “ill-
conceived” the so-called “business methods” exception to
patentability, holding that methods of doing business were patentable
subject matter.42
In the wake of State Street, the number of patents (and patent
filings) on methods of doing business over the Internet has jumped
dramatically.43 The State Street decision has also brought new
credibility to various business method patents issued before the
decision.44 Indeed, high-profile lawsuits have already been filed over
two such patents. In one case, Amazon.com is accusing
Barnesandnoble.com of willfully infringing Amazon’s patent on one-
click ordering, which lets online shoppers buy items by clicking a
single button on a Web site.45 In the other case, Priceline.com is suing
Microsoft for infringing upon a patent covering its “reverse auction”
model. The Priceline patent claims a computer network-implemented
business method that receives from a consumer a conditional
purchase offer and a payment identifier, solicits the conditional
purchase offer to a number of vendors, and completes the transaction
if a vendor accepts the offer. Notably, neither the Amazon.com patent
nor the Priceline.com patent is limited to any specific implementation
in code. Rather, both patents broadly claim all computer network-
implemented versions of their business concept.46
42. Id. Under the language of the State Street decision, it appears that business methods
and mathematical algorithms can be patentable irrespective of whether they are implemented
via a computer. As a practical matter, however, most business methods and mathematical
algorithms that have economic significance will likely be implemented electronically.
43. See discussion supra note 1.
44. See Scott M. Alter, ‘State Street’ Sets Stage for New Patents, Battles, NAT’L L.J., Oct.
25, 1999, at C8 (discussing Cybergold’s patent on a system of viewing an online advertisement
as well as Open Market Inc.’s patent on an electronic payment system for ordering
merchandise).
45. George Anders and Rebecca Quick, Technology Journal: Amazon Sues
Barnesandnoble.com, WALL ST. J., Oct. 25, 1999; see also U.S. Patent No. 5,960,411 entitled
“Method and System for Placing a Purchase Order Via a Communications Network.”
46. U.S. Patent No. 5,960,411, supra note 45. Barton E. Showalter & Jeffery D. Baxter,
Strategic Use of Software Patents, 547 PLI/Pat 1057, 1070 (1999) (quoting claims of a
Priceline patent). In addition to Amazon.com and Priceline.com, Sightsound.com, which owns
patents that control “the sale of audio or video recordings in download fashion over the
Internet” has been pursuing licensing from various companies that offer music over the Internet.
See Alter, supra note 44.
Washington University Open Scholarship
p199 Rai.doc 08/25/00
212 Re-Engineering Patent Law [Vol. 2:199
Commentators have expressed concern that program patents,
particularly business method patents, are being granted on inventions
that are obvious.47 More generally, they have criticized the law’s lax
standards with respect to patents on computer-implemented
algorithms.48 As in biotechnology, the worry is that expansive
patenting will stifle future innovation and development, particularly
in the context of the Internet. If the key methods of doing business
online are patented, current and future startup companies will find
themselves mired in navigating intellectual property obstacles. As
Professor Robert Merges has observed, “if everyone had been doing a
property grab in the early days [of the Internet], we wouldn’t have
gotten where we are now.”49 Even if obvious Internet patents are
eventually struck down in litigation (because, for example, an alleged
infringer brings forward prior art not considered by the PTO), such
litigation is likely to be expensive and time-consuming. Indeed,
because of the short time window associated with the Internet
business cycle, Internet patents that are invalid pose a particular
problem: even if the patent is eventually struck down in litigation, the
short time period in which the patentee has a right to exclude others
from using the patent may be sufficient to give the patentee a
valuable first-mover advantage.
II. ADDRESSING THE RACE TO PATENT
As discussed in Part I, the biotechnology patent race differs in
some important respects from the race in computer technology.
Responsibility for the biotechnology race rests squarely with the
47. See generally Merges, supra note 1 With respect to certain patents, such as the
Amazon.com and Priceline.com patents, there is also the worry that they are claimed too
broadly.
48. See sources cited supra note 4.
49. Thomas E. Weber, Battles Over Patents Threaten to Dampen Web’s Innovative Spirit,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 8, 1999, at B1 (quoting Professor Merges). Even before the CAFC’s recent
decisions unequivocally allowed patenting of computer programs, such programs enjoyed
copyright protection; however, copyright protection is considerably less powerful than patent
protection. While a copyright protects only the “expression” in a computer program (i.e. the
object code, the source code, and certain non-literal components), patent law protects the
underlying idea. See Computer Associates International, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d
Cir. 1992). Moreover, unlike patent law, copyright law does not protect against independent
creation or reverse engineering.
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CAFC. Despite its limited understanding of DNA-based technology,
the CAFC has refused to defer to the technical expertise of the PTO.
By contrast, in the context of computer programs, the differences
between the PTO and CAFC have both technical and legal aspects.
Moreover, the PTO’s issuance of obvious business method patents
has contributed to the race. In both cases, however, there is a serious
concern that obvious patents are being issued. Thus, the key to
addressing the race to patent will be developing and implementing a
cost-effective sorting mechanism for segregating obvious material
not worthy of a patent from other material.50
One option would be a substantive legislative fix. There is,
however, reason to be cautious about a legislative fix. In the area of
biotechnology, the case against a legislative fix is quite strong. Here
the problem is not the patent statute itself but rather the CAFC’s
erroneous application of the statute. If the CAFC had applied the
nonobviousness standard correctly, in the manner suggested by the
PTO, many of the DNA-based patent applications that have been
filed could quickly have been rejected on nonobviousness grounds
(or would not have been filed in the first place). Moreover, even if
legislation clarifying the meaning of nonobviousness with respect to
DNA sequences were passed, such legislation would not
accommodate future technological developments in the
biotechnology industry. With respect to those future developments,
the CAFC might continue to misapprehend the relevant technology.
Indeed, one reason for drafting the nonobviousness standard in
general terms is precisely for the purpose of accommodating
inevitable, but largely unforeseeable, technological change in a
variety of different industries. Finally, because evaluation of the
legislative approach should examine the approach not only in theory
but also in practice, it bears mention that legislative intervention with
such a narrow, industry-specific focus would be quite susceptible to
pressure by industry groups interested in stronger property rights. The
history of narrowly tailored legislation in the intellectual property
area has one been of stronger, not weaker, property rights. For
example, the major section of the current patent statute that
50. A sorting mechanism will be cost-effective only if the benefits it confers in terms of
invalid patents avoided outweigh the costs of implementing the mechanism.
Washington University Open Scholarship
p199 Rai.doc 08/25/00
214 Re-Engineering Patent Law [Vol. 2:199
specifically addresses biotechnology provides greater protection for
such technology.51 Similarly, the Digital Millenium Copyright Act
and other recent legislation in the intellectual property area have been
criticized as giving too much weight to the interests of property
owners.52
In the area of computer-implemented algorithms, the issue of
whether a substantive legislative fix would be helpful is more
complicated. Arguably, legislation that clarified how the patentable
subject matter requirement applies to computer-implemented
algorithms, or to algorithms more generally, would be useful.
Although concerns about abstraction inform the Constitutional and
statutory language that addresses subject matter, the language does
not address how we should determine which algorithms are too
abstract to be patentable. However, even if we put the likelihood of
distorting interest group pressures aside, it is not immediately clear
what a legislative fix would provide. Codifying the “physicality”
requirement of the FWA test would be an imperfect solution, as the
physicality test does an imprecise job of distinguishing abstract
mathematical algorithms from those that are not abstract. In State
Street, for example, the share value calculation performed by the
patented invention may have been non-physical but it was hardly
abstract.
By the same token, the CAFC’s decision to focus exclusively on
usefulness has even more significant drawbacks. As interpreted by
the CAFC, usefulness establishes no significant limits on
patentability. In the Alappat case, for example, the CAFC held that
the “smooth waveform” that resulted from performing a series of
mathematical calculations on raw input data represented a useful
result.53 Moreover, even if we were to adopt a more stringent
51. See 35 U.S.C. § 103(b)(1) (1994) (allowing patent protection for biotechnology
processes, even if they produce obvious products). The area of specialized intellectual property
legislation thus provides an illustration of the central tenets of public choice theory. See
generally George Stigler, A Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3
(1971); see also James Q. Wilson, The Politics of Regulation, in THE  POLITICS OF REGULATION
357, 369 (James Q. Wilson ed., 1980) (discussing rent-seeking by small, politically active
interest groups).
52. See Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First amendment Constraints on
Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354 (1999).
53. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
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definition of usefulness, this definition might not serve as much of a
barrier. Even the most abstract mathematical algorithm could, if used
in particular contexts, produce useful results. For instance, the binary
number results produced by the number conversion process at issue
in Gottschalk could have been useful in many different industrial and
commercial contexts. As the court in Gottschalk noted, the end uses
of the binary numbers could have included everything from “the
operation of a train to verification of drivers’ licenses to researching
the law books for precedents.”54
Thus, at least at this juncture, it is not clear that a substantive
change in the patent law which cleanly separates abstract algorithms
from non-abstract ones can be formulated. Even if we could come up
with a bright-line rule for determining abstraction, it is by no means
clear that abstraction should be the economically relevant dividing
line. As a matter of first principles, we might want to do an economic
analysis of the net costs and net benefits of allowing patents on
algorithms. Such analysis might reveal that while patents on certain
types of algorithms are economically appropriate, patents on other
types are inappropriate. For example, given the impressive history of
business concept/method development in the era before patents, there
may be no need to set up a proprietary system to encourage the
creation of such concepts and methods.
For these reasons any substantive change in the patent law
governing algorithms is likely to be a difficult, contested undertaking.
Indeed, the proposals commentators have suggested thus far vary
widely.55 Irrespective of whether an appropriate substantive change in
the patent law can be formulated, it is clear that patents that are
obvious given the prior art should not be allowed.56 There is little
reason, economic or otherwise, to allow property rights on
information that is common knowledge within a field.57 Indeed,
54. Gottschalk, supra note 24, at 68.
55. See sources cited supra note 4.
56. Merges, supra note 1, at 592. See also Dennis S. Karjala, The Relative Roles of Patent
and Copyright in the Protection of Computer Programs, 17 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER &
INFO. L. 41, 43 (1998) (noting that “[b]ecause the subject matter question has now been
mooted, essentially by fiat, patent lawyers must now begin to deal with the real issues of
program novelty and nonobviousness”).
57. A few patent scholars disagree. They suggest that patent protection might be granted
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proper application of the nonobviousness58 requirement has the
potential to weed out a significant number of biotechnology and
computer program patents. For example, as was argued above, the
hundreds of thousands of patent applications that have been filed on
gene sequences of unknown function should be denied on
obviousness grounds. Similarly, commentators have argued that the
majority of Internet business method patents— including the patents
at issue in the Amazon.com and Priceline.com disputes— are
obvious.59
If nonobviousness is going to play a key role in both
biotechnology and computer software patenting, then it is important
to determine the best institutional mechanism for making the
nonobviousness determination. Nonobviousness is similar to other
patentability requirements in that it represents a mixed question of
even for an obvious invention in order to induce investment in developing the invention. See
generally Edmund Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265
(1977). This view has been subject to much criticism. See Rai, supra note 18 (discussing
criticisms put forward by various commentators).
58. The question of precisely what “obvious” should mean in the field of computer
software merits some discussion. Julie Cohen has argued, for example, that nonobviousness
should represent the main patentability hurdle for computer software claimants and that
examiners reviewing such software claims should invoke an “innovative programmer” test. See
Julie E. Cohen, Reverse Engineering and the Rise of Electronic Vigilantism: Intellectual
Property Implications of “Lock-Out” Programs, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1091, 1169 (1995). Under
this test both general purpose computing equipment and the mathematical algorithm at issue in
the software would be considered to be part of the prior art. Id. The question would then
become whether the software would have been obvious to a programmer of ordinary skill who
knew the algorithm and desired to implement the algorithm via a computer. Id. For present
purposes, the difficulty with this test is that in taking all mathematical algorithms to be a part of
the prior art, it essentially assumes that mathematical algorithms are not patentable subject
matter. Although such an assumption may ultimately be warranted, it would represent a
significant departure from current law. In this Article, I use a nonobviousness standard that does
not assume that mathematical algorithms are necessarily unpatentable. Under this standard the
nonobviousness determination is made with respect to the component of the invention that is
claimed to be novel. Thus, for example, in the case of the asset management system at issue in
State Street, if the business method at issue were claimed to be novel, then the nonobviousness
of the invention would be judged against the understanding of the person of ordinary skill in the
development of business methods. On the other hand, if the programming method that
translated the business method into a piece of computer software were claimed to be novel, then
the nonobviousness of the invention would be judged against the understanding of the
programmer with average skill in the art.
59. See Mike France, Why We Don’t Need Patent Reform— Yet, BUS. WK., Dec. 20, 1999
(referring to expert views).
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law and fact (or, equivalently, an application of law to fact).60
Nonobviousness disputes are arguably unique, however, in that such
disputes almost always turn on disputed factual questions. As the
Supreme Court has emphasized, the statutory inquiry regarding
whether an invention “would have been obvious at the time the
invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art” is
inextricably bound up with factual questions regarding the scope and
content of the prior art in the particular field, differences between the
prior art and the claims at issue, and the level of ordinary skill in the
pertinent art.61 Indeed, the Court has analogized the determination of
nonobviousness to such intensely factual determinations such as
negligence and scienter.62 In the context of the hundreds of thousands
of patent applications that are filed annually, only administrative
agencies like the PTO, which can call upon thousands of highly
specialized personnel, have the institutional resources to make the
complex factual determinations underlying nonobviousness. In
contrast, the CAFC (like appellate courts generally) operates under
resource constraints that constrain its ability to see more than a small
fraction of the technological innovations on which patents are
sought.63 Moreover, because of limited resources, the amount of
technical knowledge that can be wielded by any appellate court—
including a specialized court like the CAFC— is quite limited. While
the CAFC has a number of judges who are technically trained, they
are not (and, indeed, could not be) trained in every area of science in
60. As was noted above, see supra 20, the Federal Circuit has justified its de novo review
of nonobviousness by arguing that it is simply a conclusion of law. For the reasons stated in the
text, however, the Federal Circuit’s view is mistaken. The other patentability requirements—
patentable subject matter, utility, novelty, and written description/enablement— also represent
mixed questions of law and fact. The same analysis of institutional competence that applies to
nonobviousness would, therefore, presumably also apply to these other requirements.
61. See Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1965). The factual underpinnings of the
nonobviousness inquiry are so clear that one may, on first examination, wonder whether the
inquiry has any legal component. Nonobviousness does have a legal component to the extent
that it is central to the “ultimate question of patent validity, [which] is one of law.” On the other
hand, because the legal questions surrounding obviousness have largely been resolved, facts
generally represent the centerpiece of the nonobviousness determination.  Id.
62. Id. at 18.
63. See NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN
LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 142-49 (1994) (observing that adjudicative capacity
cannot be expanded as easily as the capacities of the market).
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which any given patent dispute may arise.64 As Professor Rochelle
Dreyfuss has noted, in cases like nonobviousness “[w]here the law is
clear but difficult to apply to complex factual situations,” expertise is
most usefully deployed not at the appellate level but at the
administrative or trial level.65
For these reasons, those who have acknowledged the central role
of nonobviousness, particularly in the context of computer programs,
have argued for various reforms to make the PTO more capable of
distinguishing obvious inventions from nonobvious ones. Although
these reforms would necessarily cost money, such costs should be
relatively small compared to the costs created by invalid patents. One
relatively straightforward reform would involve an increase in the
number and quality of patent examiners.66 Another reform might
involve changing the incentive structure of the PTO so that examiners
are no longer encouraged to issue patents. Currently, examiners are
compensated in part based on the number of final dispositions of
patents that they accumulate. Because it is easier and faster to achieve
a final disposition by allowing a patent than by denying one, there is
an incentive to allow applications.67
Finally, perhaps the most effective reform would involve
instituting an opposition proceeding that allowed interested private
parties to challenge the validity of particular patent applications.68
These opposition proceedings could be similar to the opposition
procedures currently in place for trademark grants. Under the U.S.
system for trademarks, trademark applications that the PTO has
tentatively approved are published. Those who object to the issue of
the trademark can lodge their objections prior to final approval of the
trademark. Pre-grant opposition proceedings could, at least in theory,
64. Notably, in certain cases no technical training may be better than training in an area
that is inapplicable. For example, the cases that have misconstrued the application of the
nonobviousness requirement to DNA were decided by a judge (Judge Lourie) who has a Ph.D.
in chemistry (as contrasted with molecular biology or biochemistry). See ALMANAC OF THE
FEDERAL JUDICIARY (Christine Houser, ed., 1999).
65. Dreyfuss, supra note 6, at 74.
66. Merges, supra note 1, at 607. Because the PTO is funded in part by the continuation
fees it receives from patents that are maintained, there is an institutional incentive to grant
patents.
67. Id.
68. See, e.g., Merges, supra note 1, at 611-15.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol2/iss1/7
p199 Rai.doc 08/25/00
2000] The Role of Deference to PTO Patent Denials 219
cohere well with recent changes in the patent law that will, effective
November 29, 2000, require patent applications to be published 18
months after filing.69 Prior to this recent legislation, the only prior art
available to the examiner was that cited by the patent applicant or
found by the examiner, because patents were granted in confidential
ex parte proceedings. This pool of prior art was often quite limited.
Recent empirical work by Professors John Allison and Mark Lemley
has shown that patents subsequently invalidated in litigation were
generally invalidated on the basis of prior art not considered by the
PTO.70 The confidential ex parte nature of the patent grant process
has represented a particular problem in the context of computer
programs. Because software patents (particularly patents on software-
implemented business concepts) only began to be issued relatively
recently, a large amount of the prior art in the software area is not in
the area of prior patents. Thus, for purposes of the nonobviousness
determination, the ordinary PTO process of searching patent
databases will not yield much of the relevant prior art.71 In contrast,
in an opposition proceeding, private parties who were knowledgeable
about the industry in question could bring forward prior art. Indeed,
competitors of patent applicants would have every incentive to call
attention to such prior art.
PTO reform is clearly necessary. It is, however, by no means
sufficient. After all, the patent gold rush has emerged has emerged
from the confluence of two synergistic practices— not only the PTO’s
69. American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, § 4502, to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 122.
As a practical matter, however, the current version of the disclosure provision mandates that the
PTO “establish appropriate procedures to ensure that no protest or other form of pre-issuance
opposition to the grant of a patent on an application . . . be initiated after publication of the
application without the express written consent of the applicant.” Id.
70. See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of
Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 204 (1998).
71. Merges, supra note 1, at 589-90. See also OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S.
CONG., FINDING A BALANCE: COMPUTER SOFTWARE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, AND THE
CHALLENGE OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 24 (1992) (arguing that improving software patent
quality will involve “filling in” information about prior art). The PTO has, however, started
taking steps to address its deficiencies in the software area. For example, in 1995 it started
hiring examiners trained in computer science. Van Dyke, supra note 1, at C20. Moreover, the
PTO recently announced that it would take steps to improve the process of checking prior art
for computerized business method patents. See Anna Wilde Matthews, U.S. Will Give Web
Patents More Scrutiny, WALL ST. J., Mar. 29, 2000, at B1.
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tendency to grant obvious or otherwise invalid patents but also the
CAFC’s reversal of POTO patentability denials. PTO reform will be
for naught if the CAFC continues its current practice of refusing to
defer. Indeed, even absent PTO reform (or with incomplete PTO
reform), deference to PTO denials of patentability is merited. This is
because the PTO’s deficiencies, in terms of incentive structure and
lack of expertise will lead it systematically to err on the side of
granting patents. These deficiencies show that there is no institutional
reason for the PTO to err when it denies patents. Similarly, any
agency bias in favor of industries that regularly seek patents before
the PTO will lead in the direction of erroneous patent grants, not
erroneous patent denials.72
PTO reform, particularly in the form of opposition proceedings, is
more important in the context of granted patents. Absent PTO reform
much invalid patents will impose costs in terms of costly
infringement litigation and the chilling of future inventions will
continue to be granted. A full discussion of the standard of review
that should apply to granted patents is beyond the scope of this
Article. It bears mention, however, that if reforms that enabled the
PTO to review fully and accurately the prior art were implemented,
the statutory presumption of validity that attaches to granted patents73
would be well justified. In that case, “deference . . . [would be] due a
qualified government agency presumed to have properly done its job,
which includes one or more examiners who are assumed to have
some expertise in interpreting the references and to be familiar from
their work with the level of skill in the art and whose duty it is to
issue only valid patents.”74 In the context of patent denials, however,
the PTO can, even under our current patent system, be “presumed to
have properly done its job.” The next Part, therefore, sketches the
72. See Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV.
L. REV. 1667, 1713 (1975) (noting, in a seminal article on agency capture theory, that “the
comparative overrepresentation of regulated or client interests in the process of agency decision
results in a persistent policy bias in favor of these interests” will lead in the direction of error of
patents grants not patent denials).
73. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1994) (“A patent shall be presumed valid”).
74. American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1359 (1984)
(arguing in favor of statutory prescription of validity for granted patents).
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legal framework for immediate application of deference principles
to PTO patent denials.
III. DEFERENCE TO PTO PATENT DENIALS: THE DOCTRINAL
ANALYSIS
From an administrative law perspective, the issue of how much
deference an agency decision should receive turns on where the
decision falls on the law/fact spectrum. As was discussed above,
nonobviousness— the single key determinant of whether particular
biotechnology or computer software will be patentable— represents a
mixed question of law and fact. For mixed questions of law and fact
(as for “pure” questions of law), the starting point for deference
analysis is the Supreme Court’s seminal decision in Chevron v.
Natural Resources Defense Council.75
Chevron enunciated a two-step framework for deference analysis.
Under the first step the court determines whether Congress has
“directly spoken to the precise question at issue.”76 If it has, “that is
the end of the matter, for the court, as well as the agency, must give
effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”77 On the
other hand, if the court determines that Congress has not spoken
directly to the question, it proceeds to step two, which requires the
court to defer to any reasonable interpretation propounded by the
agency that administers the statute.78 Chevron’s applicability to the
central patentability question of nonobviousness is relatively
straightforward. Because nonobviousness is a mixed question of law
and fact to which Congress could not have spoken directly,
application of Chevron would require proceeding to step two and
75. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). In one post-Chevron case, INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S.
421, 446 (1987), the Supreme Court suggested that Chevron might apply only in cases
involving mixed questions of law and fact. In subsequent cases, however, the Court has made it
clear that Chevron applies not only to mixed questions of law and fact but also to “pure”
questions of law. The Court’s refusal to separate mixed questions of law and fact from pure
questions of law is probably wise, as the line between what is a mixed question and what is a
pure question is exceedingly difficult to draw. See Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration
after Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2095 (1990).
76. Id. at 842.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 843.
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examining whether the PTO’s determination regarding
nonobviousness was a reasonable one.79 For example, under the
Chevron standard the PTO’s determination that DNA sequences
could be rendered obvious through the existence of prior art methods
(and not simply through the existence of structurally similar DNA)
would probably have survived review.80
Like prior case law on judicial deference to agency
interpretations, Chevron emphasized the technical expertise of the
agency as a reason for deference.81 It noted that the regulatory
scheme at issue in the case (the Clean Air Act) was technical and
complex and that judges were “not experts in the field.”82 Chevron
79. To be sure, the Supreme Court has, in recent years, striven mightily to stop at the first
step of Chevron. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court’s New Hypertextualism: An
Invitation to Cacophony and Incoherence in the Administrative State, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 749,
750 (1995) (noting that the court has gradually ceased to apply Chevron deference “to uphold
an agency construction of ambiguous statutory language, because it rarely acknowledges the
existence of ambiguity”). Nonetheless, because nonobviousness is so clearly a fact-based
inquiry, it is difficult to imagine how a court could find that, in enacting the nonobviousness
standard, Congress had unambiguously determined the question of whether any given invention
was obvious.
80. Moreover, to the extent that step two review under Chevron can be considered similar
to “arbitrary and capricious” review under § 706(2)(e) of the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA), see Ronald Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 1253, 1261 (1997) (arguing that the APA’s arbitrary and capricious test can and should be
used to provide content to the second step of the Chevron inquiry); Gary Lawson,
Reconceptualizing Chevron and Discretion: A Comment on Levin and Rubin, 72 CHI.-KENT. L.
REV. 1377, 1379 (1997) (agreeing with Levin) the so-called “frontiers of science” branch of
arbitrariness doctrine might be applicable. Under the latter doctrine the court’s recognition of its
limited capacity to make predictions in highly technical areas acts as a limitation on the scope
of its review. See Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. NRDC, 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983) (noting that “a
reviewing court must generally be at its most deferential” when an agency is “making
predictions, within its area of special expertise, at the frontiers of science”). Nonobviousness
can sometimes require an agency to make determinations that resemble predictions. For
example, in order for the PTO to determine that prior art renders a given invention obvious, it
must find that the prior art indicates a “reasonable likelihood of success” that a workable
invention will emerge. See, e.g., In re Dow Chem. Co., 837 F.2d 469, 473 (Fed. Cir. 1988);
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Quigg, 822 F.2d 1581, 1584 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
81. Prior to Chevron’s two-step inquiry, the Supreme Court took a contextual, case-by-
case approach towards deference. Under this older approach, the Court considered a variety of
factors in determining not only whether to give deference but also the degree of deference that
was due. Factors favoring deference included: evidence that the agency had particular expertise
in the area of decisionmaking (or at least a longstanding and consistent interpretation in the
area); Congressional delegation of interpretative authority to the agency; and indications that
the agency interpretation had in some way been ratified by Congress. See, e.g., Thomas W.
Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 973-75 (1992).
82. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865.
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also emphasized democratic accountability as another reason for
favoring agency interpretation to court interpretation. The Court
noted that agencies, unlike courts, are under the President’s control
and hence are directly accountable to the people.83 The Court then
relied on these dual pillars of technical expertise and democratic
accountability to justify extending a blanket presumption of
deference to agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes. The Court
reasoned that, given agency expertise and accountability, where
Congress had delegated to an agency the power to administer a
statute, it had also implicitly delegated to the agency power to
interpret gaps or ambiguities in the statute.
Chevron’s emphasis on technical expertise and democratic
accountability applies squarely to the PTO. As discussed in Part II,
technical expertise is particularly relevant to nonobviousness
determinations, which rely heavily on highly specialized fact-finding.
Moreover, as a docrinal matter, any argument that the technical
competence of an agency becomes less important when its decisions
are being reviewed by a specialized court has been laid to rest by the
recent Supreme Court decision in United States v. Haggar Apparel.84
Haggar makes it abundantly clear that Chevron analysis applies not
only to courts of general jurisdiction that review agency decisions but
also to specialized courts that conduct such review.
To be sure, the presumption of deference announced by Chevron
has engendered great controversy. Some commentators have
vigorously attacked Chevron as violating the separation of powers by
undermining the ultimate authority of courts on questions of law.85
They have also rejected the solution to the separation-of-powers
problem advanced by the Chevron Court (and by some
83. Id. at 865-66 (“While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief
Executive is . . . .”). In defending agencies on grounds of expertise and democratic
accountability, the Court followed the views of the New Deal reformers who created the
administrative state. These reformers saw the administrative state as a necessary complement to
the courts, which lacked the expertise, resources, and accountability necessary to address
complex social problems. See, e.g., Merrill, supra 81, at 1049; Sunstein, supra note 75, at 2079
(noting that New Dealers saw the administrative agency as uniquely situated to address
complex problems).
84. 526 U.S. 380 (1999).
85. See generally Cynthia Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in
the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452 (1989).
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commentators86)— that Congress delegates authority to interpret a
statute whenever it delegates authority to administer the statute. For
example, Thomas Merrill has argued that because Congress has not
enacted a statute that contains a general delegation of interpretative
authority to agencies, it contemplates that courts will typically apply
independent judgment on questions of law, “reserving deference for
administrative findings of fact or questions of policy.”87 This critique
of Chevron is bolstered by language in the Administrative Procedure
Act that directs reviewing courts to “decide all relevant questions of
law.”88
Although critics of Chevron raise significant constitutional and
statutory objections, these objections apply most squarely to “pure”
questions of statutory construction, not mixed questions of law and
fact. With respect to mixed questions, even pre-Chevron case law
accorded a high level of deference to agency decisions. For example,
in NLRB v. Hearst Publications Inc.,89 the Supreme Court
emphasized that “where the question is one of specific application of
a broad statutory term in a proceeding in which the agency
administering the statute must determine it initially, the reviewing
court’s function is limited . . ..”90 Indeed, constitutional and statutory
86. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law,
1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 516 (1989) (noting that if there is an ambiguity in a statute, and Congress
expressed no particular intent on the subject, “what we have is a conferral of discretion upon the
agency, and the only question of law presented to the courts is whether the agency has acted
within the scope of its discretion— i.e., whether its resolution of the ambiguity is reasonable”).
87. Merrill, supra note 81, at 995.
88. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1994). See also John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in
Judicial Review, 77 TEX. L. REV. 113, 189-210 (arguing, on APA grounds, against a general
delegation of interpretative authority to agencies).
89. 322 U.S. 111, 131 (1944).
90. Moreover, even with respect to so-called pure questions of law, resolving ambiguities
in a statute is often a question of policy as much as it is one of law. Sunstein, supra note 75, at
2086 (noting that the Chevron approach might be defended on these grounds). See also Richard
J. Pierce, Jr., Chevron and Its Aftermath: Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations of Statutory
Provisions, 41 VAND. L. REV. 301, 305 (1988) (noting that Congress “typically leaves the vast
majority of policy issues, including many of the most important issues, for resolution by some
other institution of government”); Cass R. Sunstein, Is Tobacco A Drug? Administrative
Agencies as Common Law Courts, 47 DUKE L.J. 1013, 1057 (1998) (“deciding how to read
ambiguities in a law involves no brooding omnipresence in the sky but an emphatically human
judgment about policy or principle”). The Chevron opinion itself indicates the Court thought
that the EPA’s resolution of the legal ambiguity at issue in the case was a policy decision. See
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845 (noting that the EPA had made a “reasonable policy choice” and that
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objections regarding the courts’ duty to interpret the law are
particularly inapplicable to nonobviousness determinations, as such
determinations almost always turn on factual questions, not legal
ones.
In addition, certain narrow interpretations of Chevron should pose
less of a problem to those who are concerned about separation of
powers and statutory language issues. For example, even some of
those who attack applying Chevron liberally to all administrative
agency interpretations note that deference to an agency’s statutory
interpretations is appropriate in the specific context where Congress
has delegated substantive rulemaking power to the agency.91 Because
the delegation to the agency is explicit, there is no need to rely on a
flawed implicit delegation account.92 Somewhat more broadly, it
could be argued that “whenever an agency is entrusted with
implementing power— whether to be exercised through rulemaking
or adjudication— agency interpretations in the course of exercising
that power are entitled to respect so long as they are reasonable.”93
If Chevron were to be applied in this manner— and there is some
evidence to suggest that the Supreme Court is so applying it94—
patentability interpretations made by the PTO in the course of
adjudication would probably be entitled to deference. In the patent
statute Congress has explicitly delegated to the PTO “all duties
required by law respecting the granting and issuing of patents and
trademarks.”95
it was “entirely appropriate for this political branch of the Government to make such policy
choices”).
91. Duffy, supra note 88, at 199-203; see also Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v
Pena, 44 F.3d 437, 441-42 (7th Cir. 1994) (“[O]nly statutory interpretations by agencies with
rule-making powers deserve substantial deference. . . . Congress develops the statutory
framework and directs the agency to flesh out the operational details.”).
92. Duffy, supra note 88, at 199.
93. Sunstein, supra note 75, at 2093.
94. See, e.g., EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 257 (1991) (arguing that
EEOC regulations interpreting Title VII statutory language did not deserve deference because
EEOC did not have authority to promulgate rules or regulations).
95. 35 U.S.C. § 6 (1994). Until recently, the Supreme Court had not specifically addressed
the precise question of whether a nonrulemaking agency (e.g., the PTO) that has been delegated
adjudicatory power should be entitled to deference for interpretations issued during
adjudications. See GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 604 (1998) (Perhaps not
surprisingly, the CAFC had argued that Chevron did not apply to any PTO interpretations,
whether issued during adjudication, In re Portola Packaging, Inc., 110 F.3d 786, 789 (Fed. Cir.
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The Federal Circuit is unlikely, of its own accord, to apply
Chevron deference to the PTO’s decisions concerning patentability. It
is likely, however, that the Supreme Court will mandate that it do so.
Recent Supreme Court decision making at the intersection of
administrative and patent law makes it clear that the Court considers
the PTO an agency to which the ordinary terms of the APA apply.
Specifically, the Court’s decision in Dickinson v. Zurko96 held that
the APA, which provides that agency factfinding shall only be set
aside if it is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or . . .
unsupported by substantial evidence”97 applies squarely to the PTO.98
Thus, to the extent the CAFC is reviewing a nonobviousness decision
in which the PTO made a specific factual determination (e.g., a
determination regarding the difference between the invention at issue
and the prior art), the CAFC is already required to show APA-level
deference. Even more importantly, the Zurko case strongly suggests
that the Supreme Court, if presented with a question regarding what
level of deference the PTO should receive on mixed questions of law
and fact, would mandate that Chevron apply.
CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that CAFC deference to PTO denials of
patent protection, specifically those denials made on grounds on
obviousness, represents an important mechanism for curtailing the
patent gold rush in biotechnology and computer software. Ideally,
1997), or during rulemaking, Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1549-50 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).
A recent Supreme Court case suggests, however, that nonrulemaking agencies that are entrusted
with adjudicatory power are entitled to deference with respect to interpretations issued during
adjudications. See INS v. Aquirre-Aquirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424 (1999) (stating that Chevron
deference applied to Board of Immigration Appeals interpretation issued during adjudication).
96. 119 S. Ct. 1816 (1999).
97. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A),(E) (1994). Technically, the “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion” standard applies to informal factfinding while the “substantial evidence” standard
applies to agency factfinding “on the record.” The two standards are, however, quite similar
substantively. Zurko, 119 S. Ct. at 1821.
98. Id. Prior to Zurko the CAFC had been using the “clearly erroneous” standard of
review enunciated in F.R.C.P. 52(a). See, e.g., In re Zurko, 142 F.3d 1447, 1459 (Fed. Cir.
1998). The clearly erroneous standard is somewhat less deferential than the APA standard. See
Dickinson v. Zurko, 119 S. Ct. 1816, 1818 (1999) (citing 2 KENNETH C. DAVIS & RICHARD J.
PIERCE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 11.2, at 174 (3d ed. 1994)).
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this implementation of deference to patent denial would be combined
with reform that enabled the PTO to do a more expert job of
distinguishing nonobvious inventions from obvious ones. Even
absent such reform, however, implementation of deference with
respect to PTO patent denials is warranted. In part, this is because the
PTO’s current structural problems make it likely to err in the
direction of erroneous patent grants, not erroneous patent denials.
Equally important, expeditious implementation of deference to patent
denials would help to reconcile two fields of law— patent law and
administrative law— whose estrangement has resulted in doctrinal
confusion and substantively bad results.
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